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CONSTITUTIONAL Law-Deference to Discriminators:
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale
I. INTRODUCTION
In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,' the United States Supreme Court held that
applying New Jersey's public accommodations law to require the Boy Scouts to
accept James Dale, an avowed homosexual, as an assistant scoutmaster in the
organization violated the Boy Scouts's First Amendment right of expressive
association.2 This Note examines the Supreme Court's treatment of the Boy Scouts's
expressive associational rights in relation to preceding decisions, 3 analyzes the Dale
Court's rationale in finding that New Jersey's public accommodations law violated
the Boy Scouts's right of expressive association, and explores the implications of
the decision.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 1978, James Dale joined the Boy Scouts at the age of eight.4 Over the course
of his youth membership in the Boy Scouts, Dale earned thirty merit badges, held
numerous leadership positions, and achieved the highest rank of Eagle Scout.5 In
1989, Dale applied for and was approved for adult membership in the Boy Scouts.6
He then began serving as assistant scoutmaster of Troop 73. Around the same time
he applied for adult membership, Dale began attending Rutgers University, where
he first acknowledged that he was gay. Dale joined the Rutgers University
Lesbian/Gay Alliance, later becoming its co-president. In 1990, Dale attended a
seminar on the psychological and health needs of homosexual teenagers. A
newspaper covering the event published an interview with Dale, including a
photograph of Dale identifying him as the co-president of the Rutgers University
Lesbian/Gay Alliance.
Shortly thereafter, Dale received a letter from Monmouth Council Executive7
James Kay, informing Dale that his adult membership had been revoked. Kay
notified Dale that his dismissal was based on the standards set forth by the Boy
Scouts that "specifically forbid membership to homosexuals."' Dale responded by
filing a complaint against the Boy Scouts in the Superior Court of New Jersey,
alleging that the Boy Scouts violated New Jersey's public accommodations statute9

1. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
2. See id. at 644.
3. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 573
(1995); Bd. of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 544 (1987); Roberts v. United
States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984).
4. Dale, 530 U.S. at 644.
5. Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 706 A.2d 270, 275 (1998).
6. Dale, 530 U.S. at 644. All subsequent factual references refer to this citation, unless otherwise cited.
7. The Boy Scouts divides its organization into national, regional, and local organizations. Dale v. Boy
Scouts of America, 734 A.2d 1196, 1201 (1999). Defendant Monmouth Council, is one of sixteen local Boy Scouts
councils in New Jersey. Id.
8. Dale, 530 U.S. at 644.
9. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-4 and 10:5-5 (West 2000). New Jersey's public accommodations statute forbids,
among other things, discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in places of public accommodation.
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and its common law when it revoked Dale's membership based exclusively on his
sexual orientation.' 0
The New Jersey Superior Court's Chancery Division granted summary judgment
in favor of the Boy Scouts, rejecting Dale's statutory and common law claims." The
New Jersey Superior Court's Appellate Division then affirmed the denial of Dale's
2
common law claim but otherwise reversed.' Finally, the New Jersey Supreme Court
3
affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Division. The court found that the Boy
Scouts do not associate for the purpose of disseminating the belief that
homosexuality is immoral, thus concluding that the state's interest in eradicating
that the statute had on the right of the
discrimination outweighed the small impact
4
Boy Scouts to expressive association.'
Following the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision that James Dale's
membership did not violate the Boy Scouts's right of expressive association, the
Boy Scouts petitioned the United States Supreme Court to decide whether the
application of New Jersey's public accommodations law violated the First
Amendment.1 5 The United States Supreme Court granted the Boy Scouts's petition
6
for certiorari and reversed the judgment of the New Jersey Supreme Court.' The
Court held that the application of New Jersey's public accommodations law violated
7
the Boy Scouts's First Amendment rights to freedom of expressive association.'
III. BACKGROUND
8
In order to eradicate discrimination in places of public accommodation,' the9New
Jersey Legislature enacted the Law Against Discrimination (LAD) in 1945.1 The

10. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 644-46. According to New Jersey common law, the "courts will invalidate an
expulsion from a private organization when the expulsion is based on reasons that violate public policy." Dale, 706
A.2d at 283 (quoting Rutledge v. Gulian, 93 N.J. 113, 119,459 A.2d 680, 683 (1983)).
did not
11. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 645. The court concluded that New Jersey's public accommodations law
Boy
the
because
alternatively,
and
accommodation,
public
of
place
a
not
it
was
because
Scouts
apply to the Boy
Scouts was a private group that fell within the "distinctly private" exception to the statute. Id. The court rejected
Dale's common law claim on the ground that the claim was duplicative of the New Jersey public accommodations
law. See id. The court also held that the Boy Scouts's First Amendment rights to expressive association prevented
the State from forcing the Boy Scouts to accept Dale. Id.
12. See Dale, 706 A.2d at 274. The Appellate Division held that New Jersey's public accommodations law
applied to the Boy Scouts, the Boy Scouts's expulsion of Dale deprived him of a public accommodation, and New
Jersey's public accommodations law did not infringe upon the Boy Scouts's freedom of expressive association. See
id.
13. See Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 734 A.2d 1196, 1200 (1999).
14. See id. at 1223.
15. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 647.
16. See id. at 601. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices O'Connor,
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined. Id. at 644. Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion, in which Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer joined. Id. at 663. Justice Souter also filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ginsburg
and Breyer joined. Id. at 700.
17. Seeid. at644.
18. See N.J. STAT. ANN. 10:5-3 (West 2000).
19. See N.J. STAT. ANN. 10:5-4 (West 2000). The statute provides that
All persons shall have the opportunity to obtain employment, and to obtain all the
accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of any place of public accommodation,
publicly assisted housing accommodation, and other real property without discrimination
because of race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, age, marital status, affectional or sexual
orientation, familial status, or sex, subject only to conditions and limitations applicable to all
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legislature determined that discrimination because of race, creed, color, national
origin, ancestry, age, sex, or marital status "threatens not only the rights and proper
privileges of the inhabitants of the State, but menaces the institutions and foundation
of a free democratic State."'2 In 1991, the Legislature amended the statute to include
"affectional or sexual orientation" among the protected categories. 2 1 It is the
constitutionality of applying this New Jersey statute to the Boy Scouts that was at
issue in Dale.22
In a line of decisions prior to Dale, the Supreme Court recognized the right to
associate for the purpose of engaging in activities protected by the First
Amendment. 23 In each of those decisions, the Court examined the constitutionality
of applying a state public accommodations law to compel an organization to admit
persons of a protected group. 4 In Roberts v. Jaycees and in Board of Directors of
Rotary Internationalv. Rotary Club of Duarte, the Court held that applying the
state's public accommodations law to compel the organization to accept women as
regular members did not abridge male members' freedom of expressive
association. 25 In contrast, in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual
Group of Boston, the Court held that the application of the state's public
accommodation law to require organizers to alter the content of their parade violated
the First Amendment. 26 The Dale Court used the reasoning in each of these
decisions in determining whether or not applying New Jersey's public
accommodations law to the Boy Scouts is constitutional.27
A. Roberts and the Freedom of Expressive Association
In Roberts, the Minneapolis and St. Paul chapters of the United States Jaycees
(Jaycees) 2s began admitting women as regular members in violation of the national
organization's bylaws, which limited regular membership to young men between the
ages of eighteen and thirty-five. 29 The national organization sanctioned the local

persons. This opportunity is recognized as and declared to be a civil right.
20. N.J. STAT. ANN. 10:5-3 (West 2000).
21. See N.J. STAT. ANN. 10:5-4 (West 2000).
22. See Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000).
23. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 573
(1995); New York State Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988); Bd. of Directors of Rotary Int'l
v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 544 (1987); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984).
The Court in New York State Club Ass'n upheld Local Law No. 63, an amendment to New York City's Human
Rights Law that made it unlawful to discriminate in any "institution, club, or place of accommodation [that] has
more than four hundred members, provides regular meal service and regularly receives payment for dues, fees, use
of space, facilities, services, meals or beverages directly or indirectly from or on behalf of nonmembers for the
furtherance of trade or business." 487 U.S. at 6 (quoting N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9) (1986)). The Court
determined that the amendment targeted clubs that had characteristics similar to the clubs in Roberts and Rotary
Club. See itt at 11-12. Although New York State Club Ass'n is important in the development of the right to freedom
of expressive association, this note focuses on Roberts, Rotary Club, and Hurley, the cases upon which the Dale
Court primarily focused.
24. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 2340-41; Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 539; Roberts, 468 U.S. at 612.
25. See Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 549; Roberts, 468 U.S. at 612.
26. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 559.
27. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 653-59.
28. The Jaycees is a nonprofit membership corporation whose purpose is to promote the growth and
development of young men's civic organizations in the United States. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 612.
29. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 613-14. Associate membership was available to women and older men. See id.
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chapters and informed them that a motion would be made to revoke their charters.3 °
The local chapters responded by filing charges of discrimination with the Minnesota
Department of Human Rights, alleging that the exclusion of women violated the
Minnesota Human Rights Act. 3' The national organization then brought suit in
federal court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent enforcement of the
Act.32
In analyzing the First Amendment freedom of expressive association claim, the
Roberts Court considered three factors: (1) the nature of the associational right
asserted,33 (2) the extent of governmental infringement on that right,3 and (3) the
compelling state interest used to justify any infringement. 35 The Court found that the
Jaycees had an associational right to take public positions on diverse issues and to
engage in civic, charitable, lobbying, fundraising, and other expressive activities. 36
The Roberts Court also determined that the Jaycees' associational right was
impaired by the Minnesota Human Rights Act, which interfered with the internal
organization and affairs of the Jaycees by requiring the Jaycees to admit women as
full voting members." The Court stated, however, that this interference did not place
"any serious burdens" on the organization's freedom of expressive association.38
The Court held that the admission of women would not hinder the organization's

ability to disseminate its views or to exclude persons holding contrary ideologies.39
The Court found it significant that the Jaycees already permitted participation by
women as associate members.' The Court rejected the Jaycees' contention that
allowing women members to vote would impair the organization's ability to
promote the views of young men, as the Court asserted that such assumptions

at 613. Associate members, however, could not vote, hold office, or participate in certain training and awards
programs. See id.
30. See id. at 614.
31. Id. The Minnesota Human Rights Act provides, "It is an unfair discriminatory practice: To deny any
person the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations
of a place of public accommodation because of race, color, creed, religion, disability, national origin or sex." Id.
(MINN. STAT. § 363.03 (3) (1982)).
32. See Roberts,468 U.S. at 615. The actual procedural history in this case is more complicated. In response
to the filing of the suit, the District Court, with the agreement of the parties, dismissed the suit without prejudice
until the state administrative proceeding ruling. Id. After the examiner in the administrative hearing concluded that
the Jaycees violated the Minnesota Human Rights Act, the Jaycees filed a renewed complaint in the District Court,
which certified the question of whether the Jaycees is a "place of public accommodation" to the Minnesota Supreme
Court. Id. at 615-16. Upon the Minnesota Supreme Court's conclusion that the Jaycees is a place of public
accommodation, the Jaycees amended its complaint to add a claim that the Minnesota Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Act was unconstitutional. Id. at 616. The District Court found for the state officials, but the
Eighth Circuit reversed on appeal. Id.
33. See id. at 626-27.
34. See id.
35. See id. at 623. "The right to associate for expressive purposes is not, however, absolute. Infringements
on that right may be justified by regulations adopted to serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression
of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms." Id.
36. See id. at 626-27.
37. See id. at 623.
38. Id. at 626.
39. See id at 627.
40. See id. Since the Jaycees permitted women to participate in many of the organization's activities, the
Court determined that "any claim that admission of women as full voting members will impair a symbolic message
conveyed by the very fact that women are not permitted to vote is attenuated at best." Id.
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rely on sexual stereotyping of the relative perspectives of men and
impermissibly
4
women. 1
Finally, the Court concluded that the slight impact the Minnesota Act had on the
Jaycees' freedom of association was justified by Minnesota's compelling interest in
eradicating discrimination against women.42 The Court recognized that assuring
women equal access to leadership skills and business contacts furthers compelling
state interests.43 The Court thus held that the application of the Minnesota Human
Rights Act to the Jaycees, compelling the organization to accept women as regular
members, did not violate the organization's First Amendment rights of expressive
association."
B. Rotary Club and Its Application of Roberts
The Supreme Court again faced a First Amendment challenge to the forced
inclusion of women in a membership organization open only to men in Board of
Directorsof Rotary Internationalv. Rotary Club of Duarte.4 The Court used the
framework established in Roberts to analyze Rotary International's constitutional
claims.46
Rotary International was a nonprofit corporation whose individual members each
belonged to a local Rotary Club.47 Rotary International declared itself to be "an
organization of business and professional men united worldwide who provide
humanitarian service, encourage high ethical standards in all vocations, and help
build goodwill and peace in the world. 4 8 Although membership in the organization
was limited to men,49 the Rotary Club classification system sought to represent a
cross-section of the business community."° When the local Rotary Club of Duarte
the
admitted three women to active membership, Rotary International revoked
5 The
International.
Rotary
in
Duarte Club's charter and terminated its membership
Duarte Club and two of its women members then filed suit in the California Superior

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

See id. at 627-28.
See id. at 623.
See id. at 626.
Seeid. at612.
481 U.S. 537 (1987).

46. See id.at 544. This framework provided that the Court was to consider separately the effect of the

challenged state action first on an individual's choice to enter into and maintain certain intimate or private
relationships and then on the individual's freedom to associate for the purpose of engaging in protected speech or
religious activities. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617-18.
47. See Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 539.
48. Id.
49. See id. at 541.

50. See id. at 540. The purpose of the classification system was to ensure "that each Rotary Club includes
a representative of every worthy and recognized business, professional, or institutional activity in the community."
id. (quoting 2 Rotary Basic Library, Club Service 67-69 (1981). App. 86).
51. See id.
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52
Court, alleging that Rotary International violated the Unruh Civil Rights Act when
53
it prohibited the admission of women into the organization.
When this case reached the United States Supreme Court, the Court, as it did in
Roberts,54 first considered whether application of the public accommodations law
interfered with the organization's ability to carry out its purposes." The Court
determined that the Unruh Act did not infringe on Rotary members' right of
expressive association because the admission of women would not alter Rotary
Clubs' goals of humanitarian service, high ethical standards in all vocations, good
will, and peace.56 Moreover, the Court found that the Unruh Act did not require the
organization to abandon its classification system or to admit members who did not
represent a cross-section of the community.57 In fact, the Court noted that admitting
women would actually further the Rotary Club's expressed interest in obtaining58
members who represent every business or professional activity in the community.
The Court then stated that, even if the Unruh Act worked some slight infringement
on the Rotary members' right of expressive association, that infringement was
justified by the state's compelling interest in eliminating discrimination against
women. 59 Noting that the Roberts Court recognized a compelling state interest in
providing women equal access to leadership skills and business contacts,' the Court
6
determined that the Unruh Act served the same compelling state interest. For these
reasons, the Rotary Court held that application of the Unruh Act to California
62
Rotary Clubs did not violate the organization's right of expressive association.

C. Hurley and ForcedExpression
In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian andBisexual Group of Boston, the city
of Boston authorized the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council to organize and
conduct the St. Patrick's Day-Evacuation Day Parade.63 The Council refused
admission into the parade to the Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group
of Boston (GLIB), an organization formed for the purpose of marching in the parade
as a way for its members to express pride in their Irish heritage as gay, lesbian, and
52. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 51 (1982). The Unrh Civil Rights Act provides, in part: "All persons within the
jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, or national
origin are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business
establishments of every kind whatsoever." Id. The Act has since been amended to include disability and medical
condition among the protected traits. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 51 (2000).
53. See Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 541-42. The Superior Court entered judgment for Rotary International,
concluding that neither the Rotary Club nor the Duarte Club is a "business establishment" within the meaning of
the Unruh Act. See id at 542. The California Court of Appeal reversed, reinstating the Duarte Club as a member
of Rotary International and enjoining them from enforcing the gender requirement against the Duarte Club. See id.
at 542-43. The California Supreme Court denied appellants' petition of review. Id. at 543. The United States
Supreme Court, concluding that it had appellate jurisdiction, affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal. Id.
54. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609,623 (1984).
55. See Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 548.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See id. at 548-49.
59. See id. at 549.
60. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626.
61. See Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 549.
62. See id.
63. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 560 (1995).
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bisexual individuals." In response to the Council's refusal to admit the group in the
parade,65 GLIB filed suit in state district court, alleging that the Council violated the
state public accommodations law."
In ruling that GLIB was entitled to participate in the parade, the trial court
concluded that GLIB's admission would not interfere with the Council's First
Amendment right to expressive association. The trial court stated that the parade
lacked a common theme and a specific expressive purpose, as evidenced by the lack
of selectivity in choosing participants and the failure to circumscribe the marchers'
message.67 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed, holding that the
trial court's findings were not clearly erroneous. 68 The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to determine whether application of Massachusetts public
accommodations law to force parade organizers to include members of GLIB among
its marchers violated the parade organizers' First Amendment rights of expressive
association.69
After finding that parades are inherently expressive, ° the Supreme Court held
that application of the statute violated the parade organizers' First Amendment
rights, in which a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his own
message.7 This autonomy includes the right both to express one's values and to not
express others.72 The Court determined that, in the context of an expressive parade,
each unit of a parade contributes to the message as a whole." The Court noted that
the individual admission of homosexual members into the parade was not in dispute;
rather, the disagreement lay in the admission of GLIB as a parade unit carrying its
own banner. 74 Although the Court found a legitimate state interest in the
Massachusetts public accommodations law in eradicating discrimination,75 it found
that the state's use of its power under that law impermissibly violated the parade
organizers' rights to choose the content of its own message.76 The Court concluded
that the forced inclusion of GLIB unconstitutionally infringed on the Council's right
to freedom of expression.77

64. See id. at 561.
65. See id.
66. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. Ch. 272, 98 (1990). Massachusetts public accommodations law prohibits
discrimination on the basis of "race, color, religious creed, national origin, sex, sexual orientation..., deafness,
or treatment in any
blindness, or any physical or mental disability or ancestry" in "the admission of any person to;
place of public accommodation, resort or amusement." See also Hurley, 515 U.S. at 571-72.
67. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 562-63.
68. See id. at 563-64. The trial court found that GLIB was excluded from the parade based on the sexual
orientation of its members, that it was impossible to detect an expressive purpose in the parade, and that the parade
was a public accommodation.
69. See id. at 566.
70. See id. at 568. The Court determined that the word "parade" indicated marchers who were making some
sort of collective point. Id. Therefore, the Court concluded that parades are a form of expression, not just motion.
Id.
at 573.
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See id. at 577.
at 572.
74. See id.
75. See id. at 571. "The Massachusetts public accommodations law ... has a venerable history." Id
76. See id. at 573.
77. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573. In denying GLIB admission into the parade, the Court reasoned, "it boils
down to the choice of a speaker not to propound a particular point of view, and that choice is presumed to lie beyond
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The Roberts, Rotary Club, and Hurley decisions mark the Supreme Court's
recognition of a private organization's freedom to associate for the purpose of
expressive activities. 78 In Roberts and Rotary Club, the Court held that the state's
compelling interest in assuring women equal access to leadership and business
contacts outweighed the slight infringement on the groups' right of expressive
association.7 9 In contrast, the Court in Hurley found that the state interest in
eradicating discrimination did not outweigh the substantial infringement on the
parade organizers' right to choose the content of their own message." Thus, these
decisions represent the ends of a continuum of First Amendment expressive
associational rights. The Dale Court looked at each of these decisions to determine
where the Boy Scouts's right of expressive association was located on this
continuum.
IV. RATIONALE
In reaching its decision, the Dale Court relied on the premise that First
Amendment rights imply a corresponding right to associate with others who share
similar political, economic, social, educational, religious, and cultural views and not
to associate with those who do not share such views.8 ' This right to associate is free
from government interference into the organization or internal workings of the
82
group, unless such interference serves a compelling state interest. In determining
whether the application of New Jersey's public accommodations law violated the
Boy Scouts's First Amendment freedom of association rights, the Dale Court
considered the three factors that were identified in Roberts. 3 Specifically, the Dale
4
Court addressed (1) whether the Boy Scouts engages in "expressive association,"
(2) whether the forced inclusion of Dale as assistant scoutmaster negatively affects
the ability of the Boy Scouts to communicate its message, 5 and (3) whether the
application of New Jersey's LAD impermissibly infringes on the Boy Scouts's right
to freedom of expressive association.86
In Dale, the United States Supreme Court first examined whether the Boy Scouts
engaged in "expressive association. 8 7 The Court independently reviewed the factual
record, 8 finding that the mission of the Boy Scouts is "to instill values in young
people." 89 Some of these values are expressed in the Scout Law. "A Scout is:

the government's power to control." Id. at 575.
78. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573; Bd. of Directors of Rotary lnt'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537,
544 (1987); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984).
79. See Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 549; Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626.

80. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at573.
81.

See Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 647 (2000); Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622 ("According

protection to collective effort on behalf of shared goals is especially important in preserving political and cultural
diversity and in shielding dissident expression from suppression by the majority.").
82. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622-23.
83. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
84. Dale, 530 U.S. at 648-53.
85.
86.
87.
88.

See
See
See
See

id. at
id. at
id. at
id. at

653-56.
656-61.
648.
648-49.

89. Id. at 649 (quoting the Boy Scouts's mission statement).
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Trustworthy Obedient Loyal Cheerful Helpful Thrifty Friendly Brave Courteous
Clean Kind Reverent." 9 The Court determined that scoutmasters and assistant
scoutmasters inculcate youth members with the values of the Boy Scouts by both
expression and example. 9' Thus, the Court concluded that instilling such values in
the youth scouts constitutes expressive activity. 92
The Dale Court next determined whether the forced inclusion of Dale as an
assistant scoutmaster would significantly affect the Boy Scouts's ability to express
its views.93 This question required analyzing the Boy Scouts's views on
homosexuality.94 The Boy Scouts relied on the terms "morally straight" and "clean"
in its Scout Oath and Law to support its assertion that homosexuality is inconsistent
with its values.95 The Court also looked at previous position statements promulgated
by the Boy Scouts as evidence of the Boy Scouts's expression that homosexuality
and leadership in the organization are inappropriate." Although the Court examined
evidence demonstrating the Boy Scouts's beliefs regarding homosexuality, it did not
rely on such proof in its conclusion that the Boy Scouts advocate that homosexual
conduct is not morally straight. 97 Rather, the Court gave deference both to the
organization's assertions concerning the nature of its expression and to the
organization's view of what would impair its expression.98 While the Court noted
that such deference was limited, 99 it found that Dale's openness about his
homosexuality, his being a gay rights activist, and his being co-president of a gay
and lesbian organization forced the Boy Scouts to send a message that the
organization accepts homosexuality as a legitimate form of behavior.'0°

90. Id. at 649-50.
91. See id. at 650.
92. See id.
93. See id
94. See id.
95. See id. The Boy Scout Handbook defines "morally straight" as follows: "To be a person of strong
character, guide your life with honesty, purity, and justice. Respect and defend the rights of all people. Your
relationships with others should be honest and open. Be clean in your speech and actions, and faithful in your
religious beliefs. The values you follow as a Scout will help you become virtuous and self-reliant." Dale v. Boy
Scouts of America, 734 A.2d 1196, 1202-03. The Boy Scout Handbook defines "clean" as follows: "A Scout keeps
his body and mind fit and clean. He chooses the company of those who live by these same ideals. He helps keep
.There's another kind
his home and community clean. You never need to be ashamed of dirt that will wash off...
of dirt that won't come off by washing. It is the kind that shows up in foul language and harmful thoughts...." Id.
at 1203.
96. See Dale, 530 U.S at 651-53. A 1978 position statement to the Boy Scouts's Executive Committee,
signed by Downing B. Jenks, President of the Boy Scouts, and Harvey L Price, Chief Scout Executive, states that
the Boy Scouts of America "do not believe that homosexuality and leadership in Scouting are appropriate." Id. at
651-52. A 1991 position statement by the Boy Scouts stated that the organization "believed that homosexual
conduct is inconsistent with the requirement in the Scout Oath that a Scout be morally straight and.. clean.. and
that homosexuals do not provide a desirable role model for Scouts." Id. at 652. Similarly, a 1993 position statement
read that the Boy Scouts "has always reflected the expectations that Scouting families have had for the organization"
and the organization does not believe "that homosexuals provide a role model consistent with these expectations."
Id.
97. See id. at 652-53.
98. See id.
99. See id. at 653. "That is not to say that an expressive association can erect a shield against antidiscrimination laws simply by asserting that mere acceptance of a member from a particular group would impair
its message." Id.
100. ld. at 653.
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The Court compared the forced inclusion of Dale as assistant scoutmaster to the
forced presence of GLIB in the private St. Patrick's Day parade.'' The Court found
that, just as the presence of GLIB marching in the parade interfered with the parade
organizer's choice of message, Dale's presence forced the Boy Scouts to promulgate
a message contrary to its beliefs.0 2 The Court also rejected the New Jersey Supreme
Court's conclusion that Dale's acceptance would not significantly affect the Boy
Scouts' message. 103 The Court reasoned that (1) associations do not have to associate
for the "purpose" of disseminating a certain message to be entitled to First
Amendment protections; (2) the First Amendment protects the method of expression
used by an association, even if that method is to not address sexual issues and to
lead by example; and (3) not all members of a group have to agree on a certain
viewpoint in order for the group to enjoy First Amendment protections.'" The Court
thus concluded that the forced inclusion of Dale would significantly alter the Boy
Scouts's expression." 5
The Court then turned to the question of whether application of New Jersey's
LAD infringed on the Boy Scouts's freedom of expressive association.'10 While the
Court found that the purpose of the New Jersey public accommodations laws was
to eradicate discrimination,0 7 it held that such interests did not justify the severe
08
intrusion on the Boy Scouts's rights to freedom of expressive association. The
Court noted that First Amendment protections extend to expressions, whether they
are popular or not.'0 9 The Court proceeded to hold that applying New Jersey's public
accommodations law violated the Boy Scouts's First Amendment right of expressive
association.'o
V. ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS
The United States Supreme Court in Dale reaffirmed the constitutional
protections against the government compelling a group to express or not express a
certain belief."' In analyzing the First Amendment expressive association claim, the
Dale Court also continued to use the Roberts framework of examining the nature of
the associational right, the extent of the governmental infringement of that right, and
the compelling state interest used to justify that right." 2 In examining each factor,
however, the Dale Court's approach differed from the approaches used in Roberts
and predecessor cases. 13 Whether these changes are simply an isolated departure or

101. See id.at 653-54. (citing Hurley v. irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S.
557 (1995)).
102. Id. at 654.
103. Id. at 654-55.
104. See id. at 655-56.
105. Seeid. at656.
106. See id.
107. See id. at 656-57.
108. See id. at 661.
109. See id.
110. See id.

111. See id. at 647.
112. See supra notes 33-35, 85-86 and accompanying text.
113. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995);
Bd. of Directors of Rotary nt'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987); Roberts v. United States Jaycees,
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whether they mark a significant shift in the way the Court analyzes First
Amendment expressive association claims remains unclear in the wake of Dale.
A. Nature of Associational Right
The Dale Court found that the purpose behind the Boy Scouts's activities was to
instill values in young people."' The Court stated that such activities are expressive
in nature." ' The Court then looked to the nature of the Boy Scouts's view on
homosexuality." 6 Although the Court determined that the Scout Oath and Law do
not expressly mention sexuality or sexual orientation and that the terms "morally
straight" and "clean" are not self-defining," 7 the Court deferred to the Boy Scouts'
assertions that the organization teaches that homosexual conduct is not morally
straight."' The majority noted that "it is not the role of the courts to reject a group's
expressed values because they disagree with those values or find them internally
inconsistent."' 9
According to this language, the Court appears to be adopting a subjective test for
determining the expressive activity of an organization. Instead of independently
reviewing the organization's policies, bylaws, and literature to make an objective
determination of the nature of the group's expressive activity, the Court seems to
accept the organization's assertions in its briefs of what the nature of its expressive
activity is.' 20 Moreover, a group is allowed to define its own expressive message,
even in the course of the litigation itself.' 2' As Justice Stevens stated in his dissent
in Dale, such deference to an organization's assertion of what is the nature of its
expression "is an astounding view of the law."'2 Justice Stevens declared that he
was "unaware of any previous instance in which [the Court's] analysis of the scope
of a constitutional right was determined by looking at what a litigant asserts in his
or her brief and inquiring no further."'2 Justice Stevens's astonishment is not
unfounded, given that the Court in both Roberts and Rotary Club looked to the
bylaws of the organizations for proof of the nature of their expressions.' 2 Giving
deference to a litigant's assertions of what its expression is does not permit an
independent review to ensure that what the litigant contends is not a pretext for
discrimination.

468 U.S. 609 (1984).
114. See Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640,649 (2000).
115. See id. at 650.
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. See id. at 651. Although the Court stated that it did not need to inquire further to determine the nature
of the Boy Scouts's expressed views on homosexuality, the Court did look to position statements promulgated by
the Boy Scouts to support its conclusion. See id.
119. Id. at651.
120. See id.
121. See id. at 674-75. (Stevens J., dissenting) The dissent notes that the Boy Scouts issued the 1991 and 1993
position statements after Dale's membership had been revoked. Id.
122. Id. at 686.
123. Id.
124. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 612-13 (1984); Bd. of Directors of Rotary Int'l v.
Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 539-41 (1987).
125. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 656 (Stevens, J.. dissenting). "If this Court were to defer to whatever position an
organization is prepared to assert in its briefs, there would be no way to mark the proper boundary between genuine
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The majority's approach to examining expressive association claims places civil
rights legislation on uncertain grounds because it shields a litigant's claim from
judicial scrutiny. 6 It may now be possible for any organization that wants to
discriminate on the basis of race, gender, or sexual orientation simply to say that
their expressive message is a discriminatory one. For instance, if the Boy Scouts
were to assert in a position statement today that its definition of "morally straight"
precludes the admission of Jewish or African-American scoutmasters, would the
Court continue to give the Boy Scouts the same deference that it did in Dale? If the
Court has adopted a purely subjective test for determining the nature of an
organization's expressive activities, then it is probable that the Court would also
accept the Boy Scouts's assertions regarding its discrimination on the basis of
religion and race. Thus, the Dale holding may have broad implications in the civil
rights arena if other organizations will be given the same deference as the Boy
Scouts were given in this case.
B. Extent of Governmental Infringementon AssociationalRight
The Dale Court, in addition to deferring to the Boy Scouts's assertions regarding
the nature of its expression, yielded to the Boy Scouts's view of what would impair
its expression. 127 The Dale Court gave deference to the Boy Scouts's view that the
presence of James Dale would force the organization to send a message that the Boy
Scouts accepts homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior.' Although
the simple assertion that the presence of a member from a particular group would
impair its message is not sufficient to demonstrate infringement of an associational
right, 129 the Court found that Dale's openness about his sexuality provided sufficient
evidence that Dale's presence would force the Boy Scouts to convey a message that
it did not wish to send.

30

In contrast, the Roberts Court refused to give deference to the Jaycees' claims
that admitting women as full voting members would change the content of its
message,' 3' even though one of the organization's stated purposes was to "foster the
growth and development of young men's civic organizations."' The Court declined
allowing
"to indulge in the sexual stereotyping" underlying the contention that
speech.' 33
women to vote would change the content of the organization's
Additionally, in Rotary Club, the Court also did not give such deference to Rotary
International's claim about the content of its expression. 134 Although the General
Secretary of Rotary International testified that the exclusion of women results in an
exercises of the right to associate, on the one hand, and sham claims that are simply attempts to insulate nonexpressive private discrimination, on the other hand." Id. at 687.
126. See id. "Shielding a litigant's claim from judicial scrutiny would, in turn, render civil rights legislation
a nullity, and turn this important constitutional right into a farce." Id.
127. See id. at651.
128. See id. at 653.
129. See id.
130. See id. at 653. The Court noted that Dale was a leader in the community who was open about his sexual
orientation, the co-president of a gay and lesbian organization at college, and a gay rights activist. Id.
131.

468 U.S. 609,627-28 (1984).

132. Id. at 612-13.
133. Id. at 628.
134. See Bd. of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 548-49 (1987).
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"aspect of fellowship.. .that is enjoyed by the present male membership,"' 35 the
Court still found that admitting women did not
36 significantly affect the ability to
carry out the Rotary Clubs' various purposes.'
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Roberts may help reconcile the Court's
disparate treatment of the Boy Scouts versus the Jaycees and Rotary International.'3
Justice O'Connor wrote that the key inquiry in determining whether forced inclusion
of members of a particular group infringed on the organization's First Amendment
rights was whether the organization was primarily expressive or commercial in
nature. 131 Justice O'Connor believed that associations characterized as commercial
in nature should be subject to the rational basis test while those characterized as
expressive should be given more constitutional protections. 39 While the Roberts
majority adopted the sliding scale of associational interests as the form of review
under the First Amendment, " Justice O'Connor's expressive versus non-expressive
associations test may help elucidate the nexus between the nature of the
associational interests and the extent of the governmental interference of those
interests.
The Dale Court compared Dale's presence in the Boy Scouts to the inclusion of
GLIB members marching behind a GLIB banner in a parade. 14' In Hurley, the Court
found that a parade is inherently expressive, so the forced inclusion of a particular
group marching behind a banner infringed on the right of the organizers not to
express a particular view."' By comparing the Boy Scouts to the parade organizers,
the Court viewed the organization as more expressive in nature. 43 In contrast, the
Jaycees have a more commercial nature, as shown by its promotion of solicitation
and management skills. 44 Thus, the deference given to the Boy Scouts, but not to
the Jaycees or Rotary International, regarding both the nature of its expression and
what would impair that expression is due to the Court finding the Boy Scouts a more
expressive organization. If such deference is limited to organizations that are
expressive rather than commercial in nature, then the implications of Dale may not
be as sweeping as appears at first glance. The subjective test for the nature of the
expressive activity and for what impairs that activity may only be applied to
organizations that the Court finds more expressive than commercial.
C. Compelling State Interest Used to Justify Infringement
The Dale Court held that New Jersey's interest in eradicating discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation did not outweigh the severe intrusion on the Boy

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 541 (quoting App. to Juris. Statement G-52).
See id. at 548.
See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 631 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
See id. at 633-34.
See id. at 638.

140.
141.

See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16.41 (5th ed. 1995).
See Dale, 530 U.S. at 653-54 (comparing Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group

of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995)).
142. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 568-70.
143. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 653-54. The Dale Court noted that "[i]t seems indisputable that an association that
seeks to transmit such a system of values engages in expressive activity." Id. at 650.
144. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 639 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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45
Scouts's rights of freedom of expressive association.' The Court, however, offered
little explanation for why the balancing test weighed in favor of the Boy Scouts
beyond stating that it was applying the same sort of analysis that it applied in
Hurley.'" The Court gave a cursory discussion of the importance of New Jersey's
of the
LAD in eradicating discrimination in comparison to the lengthy discussion
47
Roberts.'
in
statute
accommodations
public
importance of Minnesota's
In Roberts and Rotary Club, the Court found that public accommodations laws
that sought to give women equal access to publicly available goods and services
48
served a compelling state interest of the highest order.' The Court also determined
that the organizations failed to demonstrate that the public accommodations laws
imposed any serious burdens on the male members' freedom of expressive
association."' The Roberts Court found that the public accommodations law
"require[d] no change in the Jaycees' creed of promoting the interests of young men,
and it impose[d] no restrictions on the organization's ability to exclude individuals
5°
with ideologies or philosophies different from those of its existing members."'
By affording the Boy Scouts deference as to how serious a burden LAD placed
on them,' while not giving the Jaycees or Rotary International the same
deference,'5 2 and by comparing Dale to Hurley's analysis of how the state's interest
53
in its public accommodations law did not outweigh the parade organizers' rights,'
the Court appears to give the Boy Scouts such deference based on its expressive,
rather than commercial, nature. Once again, by using a more subjective test in which
the Court accepts the organization's own assertions of how severe the governmental
intrusion is on its expressive associational rights, the Court allows organizations to
bypass the compelling state interest requirement. Thus, Justice Stevens has strong
shields a litigant from judicial
reasons for his criticism that such deference, which 54
scrutiny, will render civil rights legislation a nullity.

VI. CONCLUSION
Dale reinforced Roberts' associational interests review of First Amendment
expressive associations claims. Nonetheless, in what may signify a substantial shift
in First Amendment analysis, the Dale Court employed a subjective test in
reviewing an organization's expressive associational rights. The Dale Court gave
deference to an association's assertions regarding the nature of its expression, what
impairs its expression, and the severity of the governmental intrusion. By giving
organizations latitude in defining their rights of expressive association, the Court has
handed discriminatory groups an escape hatch to avoid subjection to many civil

145. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 659.
146. See id.
147. Compare Dale, 530 U.S. at 656-61, with Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623-26.
148. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 624; Bd. of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537,
549(1987).
149. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626; Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 548-49.
150. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 627.
151. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 653.
152. See supra notes 131-136 and accompanying text.
153. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 653-54.
154. See id. at 687 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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rights laws. Fortunately, this escape hatch may be limited to organizations that are
expressive, rather than commercial, in nature. Consequently, the fight in future
litigation under public accommodations laws will be in defining the nature of the
discriminatory organization.
VIRGINIA ROWLAND

